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Virtual Reality: Barter and Restructuring in Russian Industry 
 
Abstract 
 
 
A general consensus in the transition economies literature links the existence of enterprise restructuring with 
the pace of the transition process and the potential for economic growth.  The existing literature is less clear, 
however, about whether the lack of economic growth is caused by the lack of enterprise restructuring.  
Complicating the debate in Russia is the confusion regarding the role of barter transactions in enterprise 
restructuring.  Much of the confusion is generated by proponents of a “virtual economy” interpretation of 
how the Russian economy and Russian enterprise managers operate.  This paper dispels much of the 
confusion about the existence of enterprise restructuring and the corresponding role of barter by 
demonstrating why the virtual economy model fails to accurately depict economic actions or outcomes in 
Russia.  We develop the argument that barter is closely related to an absence of liquidity in the Russian 
economy, using both macro-level and micro-level data to document the consequences of “structural 
illiquidity.”  Our results are unambiguous: both the incidence and volume of barter transactions are inversely 
related to liquidity.  We conclude that analyses using barter transactions as evidence of the lack of enterprise 
restructuring in Russia stem from: (1) the lack of clear consensus about what constitutes enterprise 
restructuring in transition economies and how it varies with the stage of the transition process; (2) errant 
assumptions about managers’ objective functions; (3) the relative mix of formal and informal restructuring 
mechanisms; (4) the lack of attention to industry variation and, within industry, to managerial characteristics; 
and (5) the Texan complex (if it ain’t big, it ain’t ...) which causes analysts to ignore changes in enterprise 
operations unless they occur on a grandiose scale.   
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Virtual Reality: Barter and Restructuring in Russian Industry 
 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Almost three years of positive economic growth following the financial collapse in 1998 have failed to 
dispel widespread pessimism concerning Russia’s transition to a market economy.  Although the most recent 
reports from Russia are far more positive than they have been throughout the ten years of transition
1 – 
investment growth rather than increasing consumer demand is driving the expansion, for example  – each 
positive assessment of Russia’s economic performance is matched by an equal number of pessimistic 
reports.
2  This is hardly surprising, given the scope of change required to establish a market economy in 
Russia and the uneven pace of development across various economic, political, and social dimensions.  
However, while articles in the popular press are now more optimistic concerning the relative success of 
Russia’s transition to a market-oriented economy, current scholarly research on the Russian economy, 
especially research which focuses on the performance of domestic industry, tends to be decidedly negative 
concerning Russia’s long term economic prospects for sustained development.
3  The negativism stems in 
large part from perceptions that Russian manufacturing enterprises are not actively restructuring their 
                                                 
1 According to Goskomstat (2000, 2001), Russia achieved GDP growth of 5.4% (3.2%) in 1999, 8.3% (5.6%) in 2000; 
estimates of GDP growth in 2001 continue the positive trend: Russia’s Ministry of Economy and Trade predicts 4% 
GDP growth in 2001.  The World Bank estimates Russia’s GDP growth at 5% in 2001. 
2 See, for example, Anders Aslund, “Think Again – Some Common Misconceptions about Russia,” (2001, pp. 13-15) 
and Peter Reddaway, “Market Bolshevism Harmed Russia,” (pp. 16-19) in Transition Newsletter, vol 12, no 3 (World 
Bank/William Davidson Institute); see also:  “At Economic Forum, Foreign Investors Show Some Confidence in 
Russia’s Initial Reforms,” Wall Street Journal, 31 October 2001, and  “Russian Revival,” Financial Times, 30 
October 2001.   
3 In addition to western analysts, Broadman (2000), Desai and Idson (2000), Dyker (2000), Ericson (1999), Ickes and 
Gaddy (1998), and Millar (2000), for example, a number of Russian researchers express skepticism about future growth 
potential.  See, for example, Kleiner (2001), Pinto, Debrentsov and Morozov (2000), Polonsky and Aivazian (2000). 
Yevgeny Gavrilenko, director of Russia’s Economic Analysis Bureau, has on numerous occasions over the past year 
supported the proposition that Russia’s economic (industrial) growth cannot be sustained without the immediate 
implementation of additional structural and institutional reforms (paper presented at AAASS meetings, November 
2000; paper published in Voprosy ekonomiki, 2001; quoted in Transition Newsletter (September 2001, p. 18). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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operations.
4  Evidence of the lack of restructuring is offered in the form of the volume of barter and other 
non-monetary forms of payment made by former state-owned firms in Russia (see Table 1), as well as by the 
persistence of wage and tax arrears across most branches of Russian industry.
5    
This paper addresses two questions that remain unresolved in the literature: (1) are Russian 
enterprises actively restructuring? and (2) what role does barter play – is barter an alternative to enterprise 
restructuring or does barter facilitate restructuring?   
Why does it matter if Russian manufacturing firms are restructuring?  A general consensus in the 
transition economies literature links the existence of enterprise restructuring with the pace of the transition 
process and the potential for economic growth.  The extensive literature which has emerged in the past 
decade provides a multitude of quantitative and qualitative measures of enterprise restructuring in Russia and 
other transition economies.
6  The existing literature is less clear, however, about whether the lack of 
economic growth is caused by the lack of enterprise restructuring.  Ickes and Ericson (1999) categorize the 
literature on poor economic performance in Russia into two schools of thought: those that view poor 
economic performance as the consequence of “bad policy” and those who focus on “bad structure.”  While 
the authors acknowledge the policy mistakes of the Yeltsin era, they consider structural defects as the 
primary, and more serious, problem to be addressed by analysts and policy makers.  Collectively, they refer to 
                                                 
4 The importance of enterprise restructuring in Russia’s transition process was underscored by numerous studies 
documenting the technological backwardness of Soviet industry (Amann and Cooper 1986, Berliner 1976, Leary and 
Thornton 1989, Linz 1993, Thornton and Linz 1988), as well as by the general recognition that location and product-
mix decisions in the Soviet centrally planned economy were politically motivated (firms located in regions to reward 
local political officials or to avoid invasion), with little regard to natural economic advantage (proximity to natural 
resources, for example) ( Frydman and Rapaczynski 1997, Gregory and Stuart 1986, Krueger 1993, Linz 1988).    
5 Pinto et al (2000) are not alone in their conclusions that “virtual absence of serious enterprise restructuring” in 
Russia is driven by the “persistence of ... soft budget constraints for enterprises” (p. 298); that is, a firm’s ability to 
acquire energy and other inputs without full payment is taken as prima facie evidence of the lack of restructuring. 
Hendley et al (1997) argue that barter allows firms to sustain socialist production patterns and thus refrain from 
restructuring.  
6 Much of this literature is summarized in Djankov and Murrell (2000), Gonchar and Wulf (1998), Linz and Krueger 
(1998), and Sedaitis (2000). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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these distortions, most of which were inherited as part of the Soviet legacy, as contributing to Russia’s 
“virtual economy” (Gaddy and Ickes 1998). 
Fundamental to the “virtual economy” hypothesis (VEH) is the assumption that the primary objective 
of enterprise managers is to avoid serious restructuring.  The argument that managers seek to avoid 
restructuring is based on the assumption that the primary asset which “red executives”
7 possessed was their 
“network capital.”  That is, managers’ idiosyncratic knowledge of contacts in the power hierarchy and/or the 
supply chain allowed them to “prosper” under the old system.  Assuming that this specific knowledge is 
managers’ primary asset, understandably, managers are reluctant to devalue it by restructuring the operations 
or production assortment of their firms.  Restructuring, in the “virtual economy” model, is avoided by 
artificially inflating the balance sheets of poorly performing  (value-subtracting) firms, shielding them from 
bankruptcy and other pressures to change their operations or production assortment (Gaddy and Ickes 1998).  
Proponents of the “virtual economy” thesis argue that Russian firms engage in economy-wide 
deception that “creates” value where none exists in reality.
8  The instruments through which this deception is 
effected include widespread use of barter and other quasi-money instruments of exchange, and an apparently 
permanent level of arrears in payments to workers and suppliers, as well as to federal and local tax authorities. 
 Proponents of the “virtual economy” thesis explain the existence of barter, payment arrears, and other forms 
                                                 
7 Granick (1954) coined this phrase to describe the formal and informal behavior of Soviet managers, in contrast to 
behavior of their counterparts in market economies. 
8 Millar (1999) uses a national income accounting framework to demonstrate why this cannot happen. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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of quasi-money by the underlying structural micro-foundations of the Russian economy, and not the 
consequence of “bad policies” –  for example, excessively tight monetary policy leading to low levels of 
liquidity in the non-financial sector. 
In this paper we present an alternative explanation:  managers of formerly state-owned firms do 
consciously seek to restructure their firms and develop normally, but they are fundamentally constrained in 
their restructuring abilities by low levels of liquidity in the economy.  Support for this proposition is found in 
the response patterns of Russian managers to questions which focus on the desirability and possibility of 
avoiding non-monetary transactions.  The Institute for the Economy in Transition (IET) in Moscow surveyed 
over one thousand Russian manufacturing firms in 1999 and 2000, asking whether they would like to and 
whether they could avoid non-monetary transactions.  As seen in Table 2, more than 90% of the firms in the 
electric energy, ferrous metallurgy, chemicals, engineering (machine tools and instrument making, for 
example), construction materials and food industries responded affirmatively in 1999 to the desirability of 
avoiding non-monetary transactions.  A similar response pattern holds for the following year.  These data 
suggest that barter and other non-monetary transactions are imposed by circumstance.  Moreover, when 
asked whether they could avoid such transactions, in all but food processing, less than 50 percent of the 
manufacturing firms participating in the survey reported being able to do so.  That a significant share of firms 
engage in barter transactions, despite reporting themselves as able to avoid them, indicates that barter and 
other non-monetary transactions facilitate or enhance the firms’ operations.
9 
In Russia’s liquidity-constrained environment, barter and other non-monetary payments perform an 
important function in the transition process: until capital markets develop and contract enforcement is 
assured, barter and other non-monetary payments permit the continued survival of potentially viable firms.
10  
                                                 
9 Linz and Noguera (2002) demonstrate that barter enables a firm to produce a higher level of output than would be 
possible if transactions are restricted to cash. 
10 For further discussion, see Brana and Maurel (2000), Desai and Goldberg (2000), and Yakovlev (2000). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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We do not suggest that the travails of Russia’s economic transition have been simply the result of bad 
(macro) policies.  Rather, we argue that “structural illiquidity”
11 in the Russian economy is symptomatic of a 
deeply-rooted structural problem in the financial sector, not in the restructuring behavior of Russian 
managers.  In our analysis, the fundamental problem lies with the Russian banking sector’s unwillingness to 
lend to Russian industry at competitive interest rates for periods longer than a few months’ duration.  Failure 
to address this problem impedes the nascent progress of Russia’s transition to a fully-functioning market 
economy. 
Empirical Challenges to the Virtual Economy Hypothesis 
Despite the compelling argument put forth by proponents of the “virtual economy” hypothesis (VEH), 
we find the VEH incomplete in explaining several phenomena of the Russian economy.  One empirical 
prediction of the assumption that managers seek to preserve their network capital via the use of quasi-money 
is that the overall level of quasi-money in the economy would remain relatively stable through time.
12  Monthly 
data on the incidence of barter in Russia’s transition economy (see Figure 1) indicate a high variance over 
time in the use of quasi-money: barter accounted for a low level of total transactions in the early 1990s, 
peaked in 1998 and began to decrease after the 1998 financial collapse.  We examine alternative explanations 
for this observed pattern of barter transactions, identifying  two actors that account for a large fraction of the 
variance: the real value of Russia’s currency, the ruble, and the world market price of oil. 
                                                 
11 We acknowledge Vladimir Popov for suggesting this phrase. 
12 The terms “barter” and “quasi-money” are used interchangeably.  The literature and official data sources 
frequently combine all non-monetary transactions, including barter, veksels, and zachety because all are less liquid 
than cash, all impose extra transactions costs, and all are associated with an uncertain rate of return.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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Figure 1: Monthly Barter from 1992 to 2001
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Source: Russian Economic Barometer and Institute for Economy in Transition (IET).13 
 
Second, if the “virtual economy” hypothesis is correct and managers voluntarily choose barter over 
other means of transacting, then we should see the incidence of quasi-money more or less uniformly 
distributed across different industries.
14  In this paper we show that barter is concentrated in industries which 
are removed from the final customer (machine building and other heavy industry branches); industries which 
consequently have less direct access to cash.  The exception to this rule is the metals and non-ferrous metals 
sectors which export a considerable fraction of their total production for hard currency and thus have 
relatively good access to liquid assets.  Given Russia’s under-developed banking system, firms without direct 
access to cash have resorted to barter and other non-monetary transactions to sustain themselves.  The 
                                                 
13 Data in Figure 1 are from Russian Economic Barometer and were provided by John Littwak from OECD and were 
updated by data generously provided by Sergei Tsuklo at IET.  Data in figure 2 were provided by IET. Both sources 
use a survey of several hundred Russian enterprises to generate their results.  
14 Commander and Mumssen (1998), based on survey of over 300 enterprises, provide substantial evidence 
suggesting that barter is the result of lack of liquidity in the system, and is not preferred by managers as would be 
expected under the “virtual economy” hypothesis.  Linz and Krueger (1998, table 8) use survey data collected from 
enterprises located in several regions in Russia between 1995 and 1998 to demonstrate the significant variation in the 
use of barter by industry. 
Figure 1: Monthly Barter from 1992 to 2001 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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persistence of informal (non-market or non-monetary) transactions supports the illiquidity hypothesis;
15 that 
is, barter transactions and other forms of quasi-money are employed when cash is difficult to obtain. 
Third, we challenge not only the assumption that managers seek to avoid restructuring, but also its 
related counterpart – that the “restructuring avoidance” objective is widely shared among Russian managers.  
Our findings indicate that when managers are unconstrained in terms of access to cash, they generally 
respond aggressively to whatever opportunities are present; when liquidity constraints are binding, the scope 
of restructuring activities is restricted.  Moreover, we find that the magnitude of the restructuring response, 
holding access to cash constant, depends in large part on managerial characteristics. 
    The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections.  Section 2 develops the argument that 
barter and the use of non-monetary instruments is closely related to an absence of liquidity.  Section 3 uses 
firm-level data to show that enterprise use of barter varies widely across industries and is associated with a 
firm’s access to direct sources of cash.  We view this result as important in that it indicates that Russian 
managers are not, generally speaking, averse to restructuring per se, they just need the opportunity to do so 
and when given the opportunity, like most self-interested people, they generally take it.  We also show that, 
despite anecdotes to the contrary, barter prices are not outrageously distorted relative to cash prices, 
suggesting that barter and quasi-money are not being used by managers as a means of deception, but is the 
result of limited access to liquidity.  Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2.  Explaining Variations in the Aggregate Level of Barter 
We start from the premise that the choice of mechanism to complete a particular transaction is 
analogous to choosing a financial asset.  From this perspective, barter transactions fare rather poorly vis-a-vis 
                                                 
15 In a detailed critique of the “virtual economy” concept, Millar (1999, p. 13) offers a variety of explanations for why 
the illiquidity environment intensified prior to the financial crisis of 1998 as firms hoarded cash: (1) cash was used to 
speculate against the exchange rate, (2) cash was used to purchase interest-bearing debt instruments from the state 
budget (GKOs, OFZs), (3) cash was invested in foreign securities and/or simply (4) held in foreign exchange as a 
hedge against inflation, (5) cash was used to purchase state property being auctioned by the state to pay its bills, (6) 
cash was used by “new Russians” to consume conspicuously. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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more liquid alternatives: (1) barter transactions are more costly than cash transactions to conduct; (2) barter 
transactions have a highly uncertain return because enforcement of barter agreements depends upon trust and 
a whole chain of associated transactions in order to obtain the anticipated return.  When set against the 
advantages of cash, barter appears to be a strictly inferior asset: (1) cash transactions provide low risk and a 
high degree of certainty with respect to return, and (2) an individual cash transaction is less costly to 
complete.  Moreover, not only have the advantages of access to cash in Russia's transition economy been 
substantial (Millar 1999), cash retains significant tax avoidance advantages, although perhaps not fully 
commensurate with barter in this dimension.  In most dimensions, a cash transaction would be strictly 
preferred to a barter transaction.  This observation is supported by the response patterns of Russian managers 
(see Table 2).  
Do Russian managers choose barter transactions to preserve the network capital which they inherited 
from the Soviet era?  If so, then we should see the level of barter in the economy at the beginning of the 
transition to be relatively high and perhaps to diminish overtime.  Figure 1 graphs the share of barter in 
Russian industry from 1992 to August of 2001.  Clearly, the share of barter in industrial production varies 
considerably over time, from a very modest share near 10% in the early 1990s, to over half of total 
production in 1997-1998, before declining to 1992 levels by early 2001.  
If Russian enterprise managers choose barter to maintain existing relationships, as the VEH claims, 
we would expect to see the share of barter begin at a high level in 1992, when the vast majority of managers 
were Soviet era holdovers.  Replacement of these managers over time, through natural attrition or more active 
governance initiatives, would cause the share of barter sales to diminish.  The pattern illustrated in Figure 1, 
based on the monthly responses of over 900 Russian enterprise managers in all branches of industry, are 
clearly at odds with this prediction.  Only after the financial crisis of 1998 do we find evidence of the decline 
in the share of barter transactions.   
In addition to reporting the share of barter transactions each month, firms which participate in the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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IET surveys are asked about past trends and expected trends in the share of barter transactions.  As seen in 
Table 3, the percentage of manufacturing firms reporting an increase in barter transactions dropped from 12-
13% in the spring of 1999, to 7% at the end of the year.  More than double that percentage consistently 
reported a decline in the volume of barter transactions.  This pattern is repeated in 2000 and 2001. Moreover, 
after 1999, there is a significant decline in the percentage of managers expecting barter transactions to 
increase.  The fact that 50-60% of the manufacturing firms participating in the monthly surveys neither 
experienced nor expected a change in the volume of barter transactions may be interpreted as evidence of a 
structural problem in the Russian economy which businesses do not think will be fixed in the short term.  
Consequently, they have come to view barter transactions as “normal.”
16  Alternatively, it may reflect firms’ 
perceptions of the instability of the economy:  firms experiencing a decline in barter transactions do not 
expect it to last – the “current down” is greater than the “expected down” in almost every month. 
A second element which the VEH does not address, and would have difficulty explaining, is the fact 
that the incidence of barter varies significantly across major industrial branch.  Both Table 1 and Figure 2, 
based on survey data provided by the Institute for the Economy in Transition (IET), illustrate the incidence of 
barter across major industrial branches of Russian industry from 1996 to 2001.  The data in Figure 2 are 
averaged over the five-year period.  
 
                                                 
16 In four surveys of over 950 Russian manufacturing firms conducted in 2001 by the Institute of the Economy in 
Transition, managers were asked to respond to the question:  Do you consider that in volume terms barter 
transactions are currently above normal, below normal or normal? In each case (January, April, July, and October), 
40% of the respondents selected “normal;” about 10% viewed the current volume of barter transactions as “below 
normal.”   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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Figure 2: Average Share of Barter By Branch 1996-2001
0
5
10
15
20
25
Electric energy
Ferrous metals
Non-ferrous metals
Chemicals/petro-chem
Machine building
Wood/furniture/pulp
Building materials
Light
Food
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
B
a
r
t
e
r
 
i
n
 
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
Source: Institute for Economy in Transition (IET) 
 
Evident in Figure 2 is the low share of barter in the electric energy, metals and food processing 
industries.  Chemicals, machinery, wood products, building materials and light industry all report a 
significantly higher incidence of barter over the five year period.  Using the 51 observations from 1996 to 
2001, we regress the share of barter in total transactions, that is, the incidence of barter trades, on two 
independent variables: a dummy variable to account for the 1998 financial crisis and a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the branch was food, metals or non-ferrous metals.  This specification explains 68 percent of the 
variation in the incidence of barter and predicts an 8.5 percent lower share of barter for firms in the food 
processing, metals or non-ferrous metals industries (t-statistic = –2.67).
17   These results are consistent with 
in-depth interviews we conducted with hundreds of Russian managers over the past seven years: industry 
variation in the incidence of barter transactions coincides with access to cash and other liquid assets in the 
economy.  While the VEH makes no clear prediction concerning the pattern of barter by industrial branch, 
these data support the hypothesis that barter is more prevalent when firms are liquidity constrained.
18  
                                                 
17 The probability that this coefficient is zero is approximately 1%. 
18 See Krueger (1995, 2002 forthcoming), Linz and Krueger (1998).  
Figure 2: Average Share of Barter by Branch 1996-2001 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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If illiquidity is the primary cause of barter in Russia, then we should find a significant correlation 
between the incidence of barter and changes in the overall level of liquidity in the economy.  One common 
measure of liquidity is the ratio of claims of the banking sector on the non-financial sector relative to GDP.
19 
While this ratio is widely regarded as an  appropriate indicator of liquidity, the requisite Russian data are 
available only on a quarterly basis, which severely reduces the number of observations for our analysis.  
Nonetheless, using data from the IMF International Financial Statistics, we calculated the ratio of claims on 
the non-financial sector to GDP for Russia from 1993 to the first quarter of 2001.  After converting the 
monthly barter data to quarterly data, we examined the relationship between the liquidity measure and barter 
incidence.   
We hypothesize that the responsiveness of barter to liquidity operates with a lag.
20  We use regression 
analysis to estimate the quarterly incidence of barter as a function of our liquidity measure, the relative share 
of credit available to manufacturing firms (see Figure 3).  Our results indicate that the optimal explanatory 
power of liquidity occurs at a lag of 2-2.5 years (8-10 quarters).   Using a lag of 8 quarters, the univariate 
regression explains approximately 50 percent of the variation in the incidence of barter (measured quarterly); 
each 1 percent increase in liquidity is estimated to reduce barter by approximately 4.5 percent.
21 
                                                 
19 See the OECD 1997 Report on the Russian Federation which provides a comparison of liquidity among several 
transition economies. 
20 The assumption of a lag coincides with observed monetary phenomena in market economies, where changes in 
liquidity are only evident after several months.  In the Russian economy, where financial and other markets are less 
developed, the lag is likely to be longer than in a developed market economy.  Our reasoning for the lag is based in 
large part on the realities associated with production and contract agreements in Russia: managers make deals today 
for delivery in the future (3-6 months, for example); liquidity conditions today govern the actual (future) transaction. 
We employ a moving average to filter out “noise” in the liquidity conditions because we think that managers do not 
respond to monthly fluctuations in liquidity if they do not think the condition will persist.  The moving average 
captures the longer run (more persistent) signal of the liquidity conditions in the economy, and it is this signal that 
we believe managers utilize in their decisions. 
21 The t-statistic on this coefficient estimate is –4.5, with a sample size of 22 observations. It should be noted that 
serial correlation is a problem in this regression, as are issues of stationarity in the quarterly barter series. Moreover, 
at this lag length the number of observations falls to 20.  Fairly robust results are obtained when liquidity is lagged 
by anything in excess of 7 quarters, while almost no explanatory power is obtained at lags less than 6 quarters. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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Figure 3: Barter and Liquidity in Russia
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While the hypothesis that barter is the result of low levels of liquidity is supported by these results, 
the sample size is small and the dependent variable may be non-stationary.  Our second measure of liquidity is 
the real effective exchange rate, that is, the ruble-dollar exchange rate adjusted for inflation in Russia.  
Exchange rate data are reported weekly.  Constructing a monthly exchange rate average allows us to utilize 
the monthly barter data, thus increasing the number of observations available for our analysis by a factor of 
four.  The real effective exchange rate should mirror the level of liquidity in the economy, although the 
coefficient estimate will be opposite in sign relative to credit to the non-financial sector.
22  Initial regressions 
using the real effective exchange rate averaged over 16 months as the independent variable explained roughly 
                                                 
22 High rates coincide with a “shortage” of currency; low rates coincide with a “surplus” of currency. 
Figure 3: Barter and Liquidity in Russia William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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65 percent of the variation in monthly barter.
23  Although this is an acceptable level of explanatory power 
from a univariate regression, the model tended to significantly over-predict barter in the post-crisis period.  
We hypothesized that the over-prediction was likely caused by the dramatic increase in the world market price 
of oil after 1999, which in turn caused an appreciation in the exchange rate while simultaneously providing 
liquidity to the economy through increased government revenues.
24  When we included the monthly oil price 
in the regression, the explanatory power rose to 83 percent, substantially reducing the prediction error after 
1999 (see Figure 4).  Moreover, the estimated coefficients on the exchange rate and oil price variables are 
significant and have the correct sign.
25  In sum, our finding is that the incidence of barter is inversely related 
to liquidity, regardless of the liquidity measure used. 
                                                 
23 The real effective exchange rate in Russia has a very high month to month variance, especially in the earlyyears of 
the transition process.  In order to eliminate this high variance, a moving average was utilized.  We found that a 16- 
month moving average provided the best explanatory power while still preserving sufficient degrees of freedom. 
24 Taxes on oil exports accounts for as much as 30% of the federal tax revenues, and accounts for a substantial share 
of the hard currency earnings available to central authorities, given the regulation which requires exporting firms to 
give 50% of their dollar earnings to central authorities in exchange for rubles. 
25 A low Durbin-Watson statistic indicates a high level of serial correlation in the errors.  We re-estimated the basic 
relationship using E-Views iterative FGLS estimation for first-order serial correlation, as well as for  second-order 
serial correction results.  Despite changes in the estimation technique, the estimated coefficients remain stable.  
Unlike the quarterly data, tests for unit roots in the residuals are rejected, indicating that the series are co-integrated 
in the Granger-Engle sense.  The ADF statistic on the residuals with no intercept or trend below –5, well below the 
rejection value.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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Figure 4: Actual And Fitted Barter
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The most recent variation of the VEH argues that the central issue is neither the incidence nor the 
volume of barter transactions among Russian manufacturing firms, but rather the cross subsidization from the 
energy sector to the value-subtracting sector, that is, Russian industry (Gaddy and Ickes 2000).  In this 
iteration of the VEH, the authors argue that we should not be surprised at the decrease in barter as measured 
in rubles, because the devaluation of the exchange rate (from 7-8 rubles per dollar to 25-30 rubles per dollar) 
increased the size of the export sector relative to the rest of the (barter and domestic cash) economy by 
approximately 15- 20 percent.  Additionally, the ruble devaluation also resulted in growth in GDP measured in 
inflation-adjusted rubles.  
While Gaddy and Ickes correctly approximate the increase in the export sector relative to the rest of 
the economy, their approach vastly under-predicts the decline in the incidence of barter transactions in the 
economy.  In their example, the devaluation results in a 20 percent decline in the incidence of barter,  leading 
Figure 4: Actual and Fitted Barter William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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to an overall level of barter at 40 percent of GDP, down from the 50 percent peak in mid-1998.  Actual data 
(see Table 1 and Figure 1) indicate a much larger decline: barter transactions fall to roughly 10 percent.  
Moreover, if devaluation is the only force driving Russia's current expansion we should see a one-time 
positive shock to GDP (given an appropriate adjustment period), and then a return to the former trend; 
essentially, zero real growth.  The actual situation is much different:  real GDP growth in Russia is apparent 
for three years after the August 1998 devaluation.
26 These two outcomes – a significantly larger decline in 
barter and the apparently sustained growth in the economy –  suggest that the VEH’s underlying assumptions 
of managerial behavior, particularly the assumption that firms actively seek to avoid restructuring, are no 
longer correct (if, in fact, they ever were). 
The final component of our macro-level analysis focuses on the nature of the cross-subsidization 
from the energy sector to the rest of the economy.  A recent report by the research office of Russia’s Alpha-
Bank documents the bulk of subsidies from Gazprom and UES going to the communal housing sector, not 
industry.  Their data indicate that industry receives less than half the subsidy allocated to the housing.
27  
Indeed, the authors conclude that financing the communal housing sector, not subsidizing industry, 
constitutes the major stumbling block to reform.  
                                                 
26 The September 2001 issue of Russian Economic Trends indicates real growth in GDP throughout the year 2000 and 
continuation into the first quarter of 2001.  The Economist, 27 October 2001 (p. 102), indicates a 5% increase in GDP in 
the second quarter of 2001, over the previous year. 
27 Natalia Orlova and Andrei Roudenko, “Cross Subsidization: Roadblock to Reform,” Alpha-Bank Research 
Department (29 June 2001).  They calculate a subsidy of $3.6 billion to industry and a subsidy of $8.6 billion to the 
communal housing sector.  Using World Bank data  (http://ww.worldbank.org/data/wdi2000.pdf) , industry accounts 
for 38% of GDP in 1999, where GDP is estimated at $401.442 billion (U.S.).  Alpha-Bank shows a subsidy of $1.5 billion 
(electric) and $2.1 billion (gas) which works out to 2.3% of total sales. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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In contrast to the VEH, we find considerable and compelling evidence at the macro level in support of 
the liquidity hypothesis as the primary cause of barter in Russia.  Additionally, we find barter varies 
significantly at the industry level according to differentials in liquidity.  In the next section, we utilize firm-
level data to investigate in greater detail the relative importance of liquidity constraints in explaining barter 
transactions among Russian firms.  
3.  Barter transactions among Russian firms:  descriptive and empirical analysis 
Explanations for the widespread incidence of barter transactions among Russian manufacturing firms 
fall into two categories: choice and circumstance.  Those viewing barter transactions as a choice made by 
managers focus on the way in which barter transactions can be used to avoid taxes, divert profits, conserve 
cash, price discriminate, and delay restructuring (Gaddy and Ickes 1998, Guriev and Ickes 1999, Guriev and 
Kvassov 2001, Woodruff 1999).  Those viewing barter transactions as forced upon the firm by 
circumstances associated with the transition focus on: (1) the economic disorganization caused by the 
dismantling of the planned economy, the collapse of production chains and disruptions in supplier-customer 
relationships, as well as by the lack of an appropriate legal system (Blanchard and Kremer 1997, Carlin et al 
2000, Ellingsen 1998, Hendley et al 1998, Marin and Schnitzer 1999, Polterovich 1997); (2) liquidity 
constraints caused by high inflation, delayed government payments for goods delivered and services 
rendered, and an underdeveloped banking structure (Commander and Mumssen 1998, Brana and Maurel 
1999, Guriev, Makarov and Maurel 2000, Hendley et al 1998, Linz and Krueger 1998); and (3) the Soviet 
legacy of price formation,
28 profit confiscation, and reciprocal obligations (Gaddy and Ickes 1998, Makarov 
                                                 
28 Despite price liberalization in January 1992, tax authorities continued to use cost-plus pricing in their determination 
of the tax obligations of firms.  Firms had no incentive to sell at a price lower than the price specified by tax 
authorities, because the tax obligation was based on the cost-plus price.  Given the high proportion of specific fixed 
costs (social infrastructure, surplus labor and equipment, for example), reducing output resulted in an increase in the 
average cost of production, and thus price.  Firms found it difficult to find buyers at the designated price (cost plus 
profit markup), but could neither lower price nor declare bankruptcy (shut down).  Consequently, firms turned to 
barter transactions, it is argued, to avoid the designated price and corresponding tax obligation. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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and Kleiner 1999, Rodionov 1999, Shcherbakov and Chernavskii 1998, Woodruff 1999).
29  None of the 
studies unambiguously support either choice or circumstance.  Moreover, recent studies combine the two 
explanations, arguing that while economic disorganization and liquidity constraints (circumstance) may have 
initiated the practice of barter transactions, continued and extensive use of barter transactions can only be 
explained by choice (Carlin et al 2000, Guriev and Kvassov 2001).
30  A survey of 264 Russian firms 
conducted in Moscow, Rostov, Taganrog and Vladivostok in summer 2001 provide data to evaluate this 
proposition (see Appendix A for description of participating firms).  To enhance comparability with the 
analysis conducted in the Section 2, however, the results presented here will focus on the responses of the 
seventy-nine manufacturing firms which participated in the survey. 
Barter Transactions: Survey Results       
Nearly half of the manufacturing firms participating in the 2001 survey reported engaging in barter 
transactions.  The incidence varied by industry: more than two-thirds of the firms in heavy industry reported 
engaging in barter transactions compared to only 25 percent of the light industry firms.  Seven of the eleven 
                                                 
29 Barter transactions are not new to enterprise managers in Russia’s transition economy.  Above-plan production in 
the Soviet economy frequently traded between firms in barter arrangements (Berliner 1957 1976, Gregory and Stuart 
1986).  Moreover, persistent and pervasive shortages in the Soviet economy required the establishment of barter 
trade between firms (horizontal linkages) to obtain the requisite materials that the planning authorities (vertical 
linkages) failed to deliver.  Makarov and Kleiner (1996) estimate that 2-6% of the transactions between firms prior to 
perestroika were barter transactions established by the firms themselves in order to smooth out plan fulfillment.  In 
many instances, local party officials acted as a clearinghouse for barter transactions, thereby reducing the time and 
energy required to establish a “double coincidence of wants.”  Nesterovich (2000) estimates that between 1985 and 
1990, the acute scarcity of goods and materials generated during perestroika increased barter transactions to at least 
35% of all sales. 
30  Hendley et al (1997) argue that barter transactions enable firms to evade taxes.  If firms inflate the barter price, 
driving up the cost of obtaining inputs, their profits and thus their tax obligation is reduced.  To the extent that taxes 
are based on revenues, the seller would be unlikely to agree to such an arrangement, and the deal would be 
concluded only if the firms held unequal bargaining power.  Barter transactions may facilitate tax evasion to the 
extent that barter enables firms to avoid the banking system.  Banks act as an intermediary for tax collection – money 
deposited in the firm’s bank account is automatically reduced by the amount of the firm’s tax obligations.  Without 
banks, barter transactions (trading goods for goods) may incur less risk than cash as a means of payment – handling 
large sums of money carries with it a very real element of danger in Russia.  Finally, barter transactions (tax offsets) 
enable firms to evade their tax obligations  – over-value goods in exchange for tax payment, with side payment to tax 
authority who signs off on the over-valuation. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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responding firms in construction materials reported conducting barter trades, as did ten of the nineteen food 
processing firms.  
The manufacturing firms participating in this survey estimated that on average barter accounted for 
nearly 20% of their total transactions.  However, the percent of barter in total transactions also varied by 
industry.  Machine building and other heavy industry firms, on average, report about 30 percent of their total 
transactions involve barter.  For consumer goods, food processing and construction materials, the average 
percentage is less than 20 percent.  
Managers who reported engaging in barter transactions in 2001were asked to compare barter prices 
with cash prices.  Contrary to arguments presented in the literature where barter prices are hypothesized as 
being higher than cash prices in order to reduce the firm’s profitability and thereby reduce the firm’s tax 
burden, few firms participating in this survey paid or received higher prices for goods involved in barter 
transactions.
31  The majority (54%) responded that barter prices were the same as cash prices; 40% reported 
paying or receiving lower barter prices.  On average, barter prices were 6% lower than cash prices among the 
manufacturing firms participating in this survey.  
When asked to give examples of barter transactions, managers most often described trading their 
final product to firms supplying them with raw materials.
32  An ongoing “double coincidence of wants” may 
account for the slightly higher incidence of barter transactions among the construction materials and food 
                                                 
31  Only 5% of the manufacturing firms and 10% of the non-manufacturing firms that engaged in barter transactions 
and who responded to this question (n = 35, n= 40, respectively) reported barter prices higher than cash prices.  
32 Firms producing items used in residential and non-residential construction traded their production to firms 
supplying them with raw materials (timber, metals), as well as with firms which produced wood-working or other 
machinery.  Food processing firms describe trading oil for sunflower seed, for example.  Barter trade with suppliers 
was not limited to food processing and construction materials, however.  Firms producing packaging materials traded 
their plastic and cardboard products to firms supplying them with raw materials.  An aviation company trades 
technical services for spare parts; stevedores take payment in consumer goods or construction materials from the 
containers they loaded or unloaded. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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processing firms participating in this survey – more than half engaged in barter transactions
33 –  but the 
average share of barter trade was no higher among construction materials or food processing firms than the 
other manufacturing firms participating in the survey.
34   For firms participating in this survey, barter 
transactions were used when cash transactions were not an option.  Managers did not view barter 
transactions as a choice that they made pursuant to some strategy to sustain their network capital.  Indeed, a 
significant number of firms participating in this project reported utilizing new suppliers and/or selling to new 
buyers in 2001 in comparison to 1990 and 1998. 
Enterprise managers were asked an open-ended question about the main reasons for Russian firms to 
engage in barter deals.  Nearly 60% of the first reasons offered involved lack of cash; less than 15% of the 
first reasons offered involved higher profits (lower prices) or tax avoidance.
35   By way of comparison, 
twenty of the twenty-six manufacturing firms responding in 1999 to a question which asked about the causes 
of barter transactions selected “lack of cash payments from buyers” as the primary reason for barter 
transactions.
36  Tax avoidance dominated the second reason offered in summer 2001 as an explanation for 
barter transactions by Russian firms: that is, 43% of the firms offering a second explanation described how 
barter transactions reduced or replaced cash tax payments.  In most instances, however, respondents were 
                                                 
33 53% of the food processing firms and 60% of the construction materials firms reported engaging in barter 
transactions. 
34 Within the past year, barter trade accounted for an average of 18% of the total transactions among the food 
processing firms and an average of 17% of the total transactions among the construction materials firms, compared to 
19% for the other manufacturing firms participating in the survey.  While none of the food processing firms 
participating in the survey reported barter transactions exceeding 25%, construction materials firms reported up to 
40% of their transactions involved barter trades.  
35 The response patterns of the manufacturing firms compared to the non-manufacturing firms participating in the 
survey are different only in terms of relative magnitude: (1) both identified lack of cash as the main reason for barter 
transactions more often than any other explanation (59% and 46%, respectively), (2) both had higher profits (lower 
prices) and tax avoidance as the next most often cited cause of barter, but 23% of the non-manufacturing firms in 
comparison to 13% of the manufacturing firms described higher profits/lower prices, while an equal percentage 
(~12%) cited tax avoidance. 
36 The question asked respondents to select the relative importance in explaining barter transactions of the following 
3 options: buyers/firms have no money, avoid tax payments, obtain goods to get cash for wage payments.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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describing tax offsets (zachety) rather than a transaction which involved trading goods for goods as a 
mechanism to lower their tax burden.  
In-depth interviews conducted with several managers in summer 2001 reveal not only a lower 
reliance on barter in 2001 in comparison to previous years, but also less complicated barter trades.  
Previously, descriptions of barter transactions involved multiple firms, and frequently, at least two of the 
firms involved in the barter chain were unrelated in any production sense to either the original buying and/or 
selling firms.   For example, barter trades by firms producing steel pipes or large capacity boilers  would 
include transactions in the barter chain which would enable the pipe or boiler firm to acquire goods that could 
be sold for cash or used to pay workers (Linz 2000a, 2000b).  This past summer, however, unilateral trades 
(a swap of materials for final product) were the norm among the barter trades described by the firms 
participating in this survey. 
At the end of the interview, managers were asked to respond to a generic question about the 
incidence of barter transactions among Russian firms.  That is, managers were asked for their opinion about 
possible changes in the incidence of barter transactions among Russian firms over the course of the current 
year.
37  More than 8-in-10 (84%) anticipated no change in the incidence of barter transactions; the remainder 
expected barter transactions to decline over the course of 2001.
38   
Barter and Firm Liquidity               
Do barter transactions vary with the liquidity position of the firm?  In our analysis, one dependent 
                                                 
37 Respondents were asked: In your view, what will happen to the number of barter deals between firms in Russia 
this year; will barter trades   ____ increase   ____ remain the same   ____ decrease 
38 In an effort to check the consistency of responses related to barter trades, managers of non-manufacturing firms 
were asked to identify the percent of their transactions with suppliers that involved each of the following: (1)  money 
now, product later; (2) product now, money later; (3) money now, product now; and (4) product now traded for 
product now or later.  Of those responding, 70% of the transactions were reported as requiring money payment (an 
average of 54%) in advance of receiving the product (this coincides with the response patterns to a separate set of 
questions about prepayment); 19% reported that between 5% and 30% of their transactions involved barter (product 
for product).  This response pattern does coincide with a lower incidence of barter trades conducted by the non-
manufacturing firms participating in this survey. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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variable focuses on whether or not the firm engages in barter trade;
39 a second focuses on the percentage of 
barter in total transactions.
40 
Several questions in the survey instrument addressed the liquidity position of the firm: whether the 
firm earned profits in the current or previous year (82% said yes), whether the firm borrowed money in the 
past two years to cover operating expenses or to pay wages (22% reported borrowing to finance working 
capital, 10% borrowed to finance wage payments), whether the firm borrowed from the bank in the past two 
years (10% said yes), whether the firm borrowed from private individuals or other business organizations in 
the past two years (26% said yes), whether the firm faces prepayment obligations (73% said yes), whether 
the firm sees its current financial position as improving (35% said yes),
41 and whether the firm selects “firm’s 
lack of money” or “customers’ lack of money” as the main obstacle to doing business (97% and 95%, 
respectively).
42  In addition to these liquidity variables, we hypothesize that liquidity is highly correlated with 
particular industries.  That is, while manufacturing firms tend to sell the majority of their output to 
wholesalers or retailers rather than to final consumers,
43 industries that are closest to the cash sales of final 
consumers (food processing, construction materials, consumer goods/light industry, for example) are less 
likely to face liquidity constraints than machine building firms which sell their product to other firms.  
Consequently, we hypothesize that while the incidence of barter among firms in industries that are close to 
                                                 
39 Respondents were asked: Does your firm arrange or participate in barter deals? ___ yes   ___ no 
40 Respondents were asked:  If yes, what percent of your total transactions involved barter?  
41 Respondents were asked: Compared to last year, how will the financial position of your firm change this year? 
____ improve     ____ remain same     ____ worsen 
42 Respondents were asked: What is the main obstacle to the successful operation of your firm? ___ firm lacks 
money   ____ tax system    ___customers lack money      ____ criminal situation / crime    ____ other 
43 Prior to 1992, it was common for manufacturing firms to have a retail shop on their premises which sold the 
company’s products directly to consumers.  This practice has not been entirely disbanded, but with the growing 
multitude of well-stocked retail shops, consumers no longer need to travel to the company to purchase its product. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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final consumers (cash sales) may not necessarily be significantly lower,
44 the volume of barter transactions 
by firms in these industries will be lower.  
We first analyze the incidence of barter transactions among manufacturing firms participating in the 
survey, hypothesizing that the incidence of barter is inversely related to the firm’s liquidity position.   In the 
first specification, whether or not the firm borrowed to be able to pay wages is used as a proxy for the firm’s 
liquidity position.  Since firms can use trade credits or other non-monetary instruments to pay suppliers, one 
measure of the cash position of the firm is whether it must borrow money to pay wages.  OLS regression 
results indicate that firms which borrowed money to pay wages were significantly more likely to engage in 
barter transactions. Conversely, we hypothesized that firms which were able to pay above-average wages 
would be less likely to engage in barter.  OLS regression results substantiate this proposition: wages and 
barter are inversely related.   
                                                 
44 Firms in industries producing goods for final consumers will have a relatively easy time establishing a “double 
coincidence of wants” with their suppliers.  A swap of final goods for production materials enables producing firms 
to conserve their cash, and may enable supplying firms to obtain a marketable product at a discounted price. 
In the second specification, the firm’s report on its financial position is used as a proxy for liquidity.  
We expect that the incidence of barter will be lower among firms reporting an improving financial position, as 
well as among firms reporting profits.  Given the coding of the financial position variable (1 = better, 2 = 
same, 3 = worse), we expect a positive coefficient.  On the profit variable (where 1 = yes, earned profit), we 
expect a negative coefficient.  Financial position fares better than profit in explaining the incidence of barter 
among the manufacturing firms participating in this survey.  The coefficient on financial position has the 
expected sign and is significant at the 5% level; the profit coefficient is not significant. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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In the third specification, the prepayment requirement is used as a proxy for the liquidity position of 
the firm.  We hypothesize that firms which face prepayment requirements are more likely to engage in barter. 
 If prepayment requires cash, this reduces the firm’s liquidity, causing the firm to engage in barter.  
Alternatively, barter trade may be used to satisfy the prepayment requirement (if the firm faces a cash 
constraint).  OLS regression results substantiate the proposition that prepayment and barter are directly 
related: the prepayment coefficient is positive and significant. 
The three different measures we used to capture the firm’s liquidity position all generate the same 
outcome with regard to barter: firms with less access to cash are more likely to engage in barter transactions. 
 Additional support for this finding that barter is more likely when cash constraints are encountered is found 
when industry is used as a proxy for liquidity.  That is, when the percent of barter transactions is used as the 
dependent variable in a univariate regression with a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms in heavy industry, 
the results indicate that, ceteris paribus, heavy industry firms (machine building firms, for example) engage in 
a significantly higher volume of barter transactions than the other firms participating in this survey.
45 
                                                 
45 With 69 observations used in the regression, the coefficient on the industry dummy variable is .1245, with a t-
statistic of 3.02, significant at the 1% level.  
In contrast to the “virtual economy” hypothesis, our results point unambiguously to the role of 
liquidity in explaining both  the incidence and volume of barter transactions.  We find no support for the 
proposition that barter transactions are used to avoid restructuring.   Instead, we find managers using barter 
to obtain necessary materials, trading their final product for these inputs.  It is not the case, however, that 
these barter trades are exclusively with suppliers from the Soviet era; that is, managers are not relying on 
network capital established in the Soviet economy to maintain current operations.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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In contrast to the “virtual economy” hypothesis, our research results, like those documented by the 
monthly IET surveys, indicate that both the incidence and volume of barter transactions have declined 
significantly since 1998.  Managers were reluctant to spend time talking about barter transactions in 2001; in 
their view, barter comprised a very small component of their overall operations.   Managers were much more 
willing to talk about the restructuring activities currently taking place at their firm, as well as their plans for 
the future. 
Evidence of Enterprise Restructuring 
An extensive literature provides a multitude of quantitative and qualitative measures of enterprise 
restructuring in Russia and other transition economies.
46  Confusion surrounding the nature and scope of 
active restructuring activities by Russian manufacturing firms appears to stem from: (1) the lack of clear 
consensus about what constitutes enterprise restructuring in transition economies and how it varies with the 
stage of the transition process; (2) errant assumptions about managers’ objective functions; (3) the relative 
mix of formal and informal restructuring mechanisms; (4) the lack of attention to industry variation and, 
within industry, to managerial characteristics; and (5) the Texan complex (if it ain’t big, it ain’t ...) which 
causes analysts to ignore changes in enterprise operations unless they occur on a grandiose scale.  In light of 
the volume of empirical evidence provided on an ongoing basis by reputable western and Russian scholars 
alike, however, we are hard pressed to explain how statements regarding the lack of enterprise restructuring 
in Russia repeatedly find their way into the literature.   
 
                                                 
46 Empirical analyses of enterprise restructuring tend to focus on the impact of privatization on various performance 
indicators: change in volume or assortment of production (Earle and Telegdy 1998, Estrin and Rosevear 1999, Jones 
1998, Linz 1997, Linz and Krueger 1998) and/or employment (Bilsen and Konings 1998, Linz 2001), volume of domestic 
and foreign sales (Buck et al 1999), and profitability (Duflo and Senik-Leygonie 1997).  Numerous studies focus on 
the nature of the ownership structure: insiders versus outsiders, blockholders, foreign investors (Aghion and 
Blanchard 1996, Aghion and Carlin 1996, Anderson et al 1997), as well as managerial turnover (Barberis et al 1996, 
Claessens and Djankov 1999, Frydman et al 1998, Linz 1996, Roland and Sekkat 2000) and mechanisms used to select 
managers.  A few studies focus on the extent to which competition has an effect on improving enterprise performance 
(Brown and Brown 1998, Earle and Estrin 1998, Brown and Earle 2000). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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4.  Summary and Conclusions 
We use macro-level and micro-level data to document the link between liquidity and barter in Russian 
industry.  In doing so, we demonstrate that neither the assumptions nor the outcomes associated with the 
“virtual economy” interpretation of Russia are grounded in reality.  Rather, the issue we identify is the low 
level of liquidity in Russia’s economy, which needs far more attention from analysts.  Low liquidity levels in 
Russia are the direct consequence of unreliable contract and legal enforcement which works directly to 
reduce the supply of credit in the economy.  As we identified in a previous paper (Linz and Krueger 1998), 
we see this problem as the challenge for Russia’s economy in its efforts to achieve normalcy.   
What is to be done?  If, as Millar (2001) argues, “the transition proper is over ... what we are 
viewing ... in the former Soviet Union is ‘normal’ economic, political, and social change” (p. 2), perhaps it is 
time to reconsider the underlying premise in the restructuring literature that “winners” are firms which mimic 
their capitalist counterparts, and since little evidence is apparent that Russian firms engage in comparable 
behavior, they are all “losers.”  If the transition is over, and Russia has “gotten stuck half way to a normal 
functioning economy” (Millar 2001, p. 4), the task before us is to construct research questions and design 
research projects which incorporate this reality.  Like Alice, when confronted with Wonderland, we need to 
extend our analysis of Russia’s current economic conditions to include viable options, such as the role of 
barter transactions in facilitating the restructuring process,
47 rather than to summarily disregard these options. 
 
                                                 
47 Makarov and Kleiner (2000) explain why barter transactions may extend beyond the transition period in Russia.  Table 1:  Share of Production Sold for Barter and Cash, 1996-2001 
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  Share of Barter in Total Sales (%) 
Industry  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
            01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  Avg01 
Electric energy  -  -  -  21  4  3  3  4  2  1  0  1  8  3 
Ferrous metals  63  64  59  23  17  14  12  4  12  8  9  13  8  10 
Non-ferrous metals  42  38  13  5  31  8  5  9  5  2  1  8  3  5 
Chemicals/petro-chem  58  60  55  27  18  19  15  9  11  15  9  11  8  12 
Machine building  46  60  55  22  15  18  14  12  16  14  13  13  12  13 
Wood/furniture/pulp  45  51  42  29  21  27  22  23  26  20  20  23  24  21 
Building materials  45  54  72  29  22  22  19  29  18  21  23  13  19  18 
Light  51  58  44  26  14  13  13  17  17  10  10  13  15  11 
Food  30  21  28  18  14  8  10  12  11  10  6  7  6  9 
                             
All Industry  52  56  52  23  16  16  13  12  14  12  10  12  11  13 
 
 
  Share of Cash in Total Sales (%) 
Industry  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
            01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  Avg01 
Electric energy  -  -  -  24  52  85  91  90  90  87  97  94  82  90 
Ferrous metals  17  17  21  39  73  74  74  84  84  85  79  64  76  78 
Non-ferrous metals  37  33  35  25  73  76  85  71  83  82  83  74  67  78 
Chemicals/petro-chem  19  18  19  25  56  64  64  74  68  71  72  74  73  70 
Machine building  34  19  24  34  57  62  69  71  67  68  72  71  70  69 
Wood/furniture/pulp  36  26  37  37  54  66  67  66  64  70  63  68  69  67 
Building materials  39  28  13  21  31  51  49  55  56  57  54  63  57  55 
Light  32  26  31  40  58  68  76  72  73  75  80  78  78  75 
Food  55  61  48  59  59  81  72  68  76  75  80  77  82  76 
                             
All Industry  48  39  43  46  58  66  71  72  71  73  75  74  73  72 
 
 
  Share of “Other Financing” in Total Sales (%)* 
Industry  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
            01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  Avg01 
Electric energy  -  -  -  55  44  12  6  6  8  12  3  5  10  8 
Ferrous metals  20  19  39  68  10  12  14  12  4  7  12  23  16  11 
Non-ferrous metals  21  21  52  70  104  16  10  20  12  16  16  18  30  17 
Chemicals/petro-chem  33  22  26  48  26  17  21  17  21  14  19  15  19  18 
Machine building  20  21  21  44  28  20  17  17  16  18  15  16  18  17 
Wood/furniture/pulp  19  23  21  34  25  7  11  11  10  10  17  9  7  10 
Building materials  16  18  15  50  47  27  32  16  26  22  23  23  23  24 
Light  17  16  25  44  28  19  11  11  10  15  10  9  7  12 
Food  15  18  24  23  27  11  18  20  13  15  14  16  12  15 
                             
All Industry  0  5  5  31  26  18  16  16  15  15  15  14  16  16 
 
 
                           
*Calculated by summing barter and cash sales, and subtracting the sum from 100 percent. 
 
Source:  IET, Russian Industrial Trends Surveys, October 2000, March 2001, June 2001, September 
2001. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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Table 2: Avoid Non-Monetary Transactions 
 
 
 
Would your firm like to avoid non-monetary      Could your firm avoid non-monetary 
transactions?              transactions? 
 
           Percent responding YES              Percent responding YES   
              10/1999       5/2000    10/2000           10/1999  5/2000  10/2000 
Industry 
 
Electric energy      96     100          100      5       17       57 
Ferrous metals      91       83          100    44       42       57 
Non-ferrous metals    64       93            84    48       31       48 
Chemicals/petro-chemicals  93       77            87    39       43       48 
Engineering      92       96            87    39       39       43 
Wood/furniture/pulp    84       89            78    37       46       43 
Building materials    92       85            93    50       35       33 
Light        90       90            88    46       46       44 
Food        86       80            75    52       58       50 
 
N =               1028      n.a.            1007              1028       n.a.      1007 
 
______________________ 
Source: Institute for the Economy in Transition (October 2000). 
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Table 3: Trends in Barter Transactions, 1999-2001 
 
 
What has been the trend over the past 2-3 months        What is the expected trend for the 
of the volume of barter transactions?             next 2-3 months in volume of barter 
      transactions? 
 
1999        Up  Same  Down  N/A    Up  Same  Down  N/A   
      (Percent responding)           (Percent responding)    
 
March  (n = 1022)    12     65     13   10    17   61     11   11 
April    (n = 1025)    13     57     20   20    14   59     13   14 
May  (n = 1012)      8     65        18     9      9   58     21   12 
June  (n = 1053)      8     62     20   10      8   65     14   13 
July  (n = 1067)      7     55     28   10      7   58     17   16 
August  (n = 1001)      5     71     17     7      8   65     17   10 
September (n = 1001)      8     60     22   10    11   61     18   10 
October      (n = 1048)      9     60     22     9    10   65     14   11  
November  (n = 1034)      7     65     16   12    10   58     18   14 
December   (n = 1028)      7     60     19   11      6   61     17   16 
 
 
2000        Up  Same  Down  N/A    Up  Same  Down  N/A   
         (Percent responding)               (Percent responding)  
 
February    (n = 1052)      7    63     19   11      7   64     15   14 
April  (n = 1037)      6     57     22   15      6   60     17   17 
May   (n = 1047)      6    60     19   15      7   59     17   17 
June  (n = 1039)      3    61     24   12      6   62     19   13 
July   (n = 1009)      6    59     24   11      5   60     18   17 
August  (n = 999)      4    54     29   13      5   51     31   13 
September (n = n/a)      5    53     27   15      5   50     13   25 
October (n=1003)      4         53     28   15      5   53     24   19  
November (n=1007)      2    57     26   15      4   59     21   16 
December (n = 996)      2    61     22   15      4   57     23   16 
 
2001        Up  Same  Down  N/A    Up  Same  Down  N/A   
         (Percent responding)               (Percent responding)  
 
January (n = 1045)     4   54     23   19     6  55     12   27 
February (n = 1000)     6   52     19   23     5  61     11   23 
March (n = 902)     4   58       18   20     5  60     12   23 
April (n = 1001)    6   54     17   23     5  54     13   38 
May (n = 1009)    5   58     20   17     5  62     15   18   
June (n = n/a)       6   51     20   23     29  44     17   10 
July (n = 989)       5   57     17   21     4  57     12   27 
August (n = 970)     4   58     18   20     6       60     14   20 
September (n = 959)     2           59     18    21     3       60     13   24 
October (n = 962)     2   63     16   19     3  54     14   29 
____________ 
Source: Institute for the Economy in Transition       William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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Appendix A:  
Sample Description 
 
 
 
A total of 264 Russian firms participated in a survey conducted in Moscow, Rostov
48 and Vladivostok in 
spring and summer 2001.  The project focused on a series of topics related to current business conditions in 
Russia, with particular attention to barriers to investment.  Local project coordinators contacted companies 
and arranged to interview the owner, executive director, or his/her representative.
49  Sample selection 
procedures were guided by the directive to local project coordinators to include as wide a variety as possible 
among the participating firms in each location.
50  Top-level managers or owners responded to more than 40 
questions related to the operation and performance of their company.  Among the 264 participating firms, 
46% were retail shops, 30% were manufacturing plants, and 24% were “other” (non-retail) service sector 
firms.
51   
 
Workforce size varied significantly by type of firm: retail shops employed, on average, 43 workers; 
manufacturing plants employed 373 workers, on average; and other service sector firms employed 78 
workers.  Average wages also varied by type of firm, with retail shops paying, on average, 3108 rubles per 
month; manufacturing firms paying 2010 rubles per month, and other service sector firms paying an average 
of 1977 rubles per month.  Equally striking is the regional wage variation.  Among retail shops, where the 
skills required for employment are approximately the same regardless of region, average monthly wages were 
reported at 5213 in Moscow, 4007 in Vladivostok, 2010 in Rostov, and 1440 in Taganrog (~ 100 km from 
Rostov).  
 
The majority of firms (62%) reported their ownership structure as limited liability; 22% reported their 
ownership structure as joint stock, of which more than two-thirds were “closed.”  Just over 10% of the 
firms were privately-owned; 2% were owned by municipal organizations.  The 264 participating firms were 
nearly equally split between leasing and owning the facilities in which their company operated: 51% reported 
that they leased the buildings; 49% reported owning.  Not surprisingly given regional price differentials, the 
relative share of firms leasing their facilities was higher in Moscow (95%) and Vladivostok (72%) than among 
firms in the Rostov region.
52  
 
                                                 
48  Of the firms located in Rostov region, 136 were located in Taganrog, 35 in Rostov, and 3 in Azov. 
49 In some instances it was possible to have a bookkeeper provide information for 2-3 firms; that is, if one person kept 
the books for multiple firms, this person was asked to participate in multiple interview sessions (one for each firm).  
50 I thank Michael Morozov, Inna Petrova, and Larissa Chouripa for their assistance with the data collection involved 
in this project. 
51 Although separate questionnaires were developed to take into account differences associated with the operation 
and performance of the three types of firms (retail, manufacturing, services), a core set of 32 questions was included 
in all versions. 
52 In Taganrog, 70% of the firms reported owning the building(s) in which their company operated. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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Retail Shops 
 
Owners or top-level managers of 122 retail shops participated in the interview project.  Of these, 40 were 
located in Moscow, 52 in Taganrog, 10 in Rostov, and 20 in Vladivostok.  The participating firms employed, 
on average, 43 workers, and operated, on average, in 4 locations.
53  The retail shops participating in this 
survey included 30 firms reporting sales dominated by food items, 40 firms reporting sales dominated by 
alcohol, tobacco products and candy, and 26 firms selling various consumer goods (clothing, video 
equipment, cosmetics, household items and souvenirs, for example).   
 
The retail shop respondents were asked whether the company earned a profit in the first year of operations: 
84% responded affirmatively.  When asked about the percent of profit re-invested in the firm, the responses 
ranged from 2% to 100%, with a mean of 42%.  When asked how their current financial position compares 
with the previous year, responses were equally split between “better” and “the same.”  There was significant 
regional variation in the response patterns: retail shops in Moscow and Vladivostok were much less likely to 
say “better” than their counterparts in Rostov and Taganrog. 
 
To capture changes in consumer preferences,
54 respondents were asked about the percent of the shop’s 
current merchandise that was made in Russia, and how that figure compares to 1998.  Retail shops report 
that, on average, 68% of their current merchandise was made in Russia, and 77% of the retail shops report 
that the proportion of Russian-made goods nowadays is greater (higher) than what the shop offered in 1998.  
There was no significant variation in response patterns by region with regard to these results. 
 
The retail shops participating in this study were in agreement about what needs to be done to improve 
economic and business conditions in Russia: reduce taxes, improve the laws and legal system, and stabilize 
the economy at a level of operation that generates a higher income for the average worker.   
 
 
Manufacturing Firms 
 
Of the 79 manufacturing plants participating in the project, 41 were located in Taganrog (52%), 22 in Rostov 
 (28%), 2 in Azov, and 14 in Vladivostok.  One-third of the firms were engaged in the production of 
consumer goods (light industry), employing an average of 150 workers; one-quarter were food processing 
plants, employing an average of 457 workers.  Producers of construction materials accounted for 13% of the 
firms and employed an average of 286 workers; 4% of the firms produced machinery and equipment (heavy 
industry), employing on average 1367 workers.  The majority of firms reported their ownership structure as 
                                                 
53 Among retail shops in Moscow, average workforce size was 28 employees; in Taganrog, 59 employees; in Rostov, 
58 employees, and in Vladivostok, 10 employees.  Retail shops in Moscow, on average, operated in 2 locations; in 
Taganrog, in 5 locations; in Rostov, in 3 locations, and in Vladivostok, in 4 locations. 
54 At the beginning of the transition process, various market students indicate that Russian consumers reported 
preferring non-Russian goods (see Huddleston and Good 1996, BISNIS October 2001).  Shops were stocked almost 
exclusively with imported goods from 1993-1997.  Since the financial crisis in August 1998, shelves appear to 
encompass a greater portion of Russian-made goods.  This study attempted to identify the share of Russian-made 
products which retail shops tend to stock (sell). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 465 
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joint stock (46%) or limited liability (44%). 
 
On average, the participating manufacturing firms paid 2010 rubles per month, with food processing firms 
paying 2233 rubles per month, construction materials firms paying 2230 per month, heavy industry firms 
paying 2100 per month, and light industry firms paying 1964 per month.  Among the food processing plants, 
average wages were highest in Vladivostok (4375 rubles), with firms in Rostov paying 2200 rubles per 
month.  Food processing plants in Taganrog paid an average of 1490 rubles per month. 
 
Two-thirds of the manufacturing firms participating in this project leased the buildings in which their 
company operated (among food processing plants, only 11% reported leasing their facilities).  Among those 
reporting ownership of the buildings in which their company operated, 58% were located in Taganrog, 27% 
in Rostov, and 12% in Vladivostok.   
 
Just over one-quarter of the participating manufacturing firms reported plans for renovating their plant during 
the current year.  On average, these firms report needing to replace 40% of their capital stock and 13% of 
their workers. 
 
 
Other Service Sector Firms 
 
Many of the 63 non-retail firms participating in this survey were involved in wholesale trade or repair work.  
Average wages paid by these firms ranged from 1463 rubles per month in Taganrog to 4052 rubles per month 
in Vladivostok.  These firms employed an average of 78 workers, and were equally split between owning 
(50%) and leasing (50%) the facilities in which their company operated.   
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